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The Virtuous State: Polybius, Machiavelli, and the Idea of Roman Virtue

Is it possible for two historians, separated by a millennium and a half of cultural and
historical change, to address the same topic and come to the same conclusion? Or does the
passage of so many centuries mean that each will by default be working within fundamentally
different—and therefore mutually exclusive—paradigms? Those linked questions form the
bedrock of the following discussion of the idea of Roman virtue. Secondary questions—what is
‘Roman virtue?’ How does it come about? What did it mean in its own time? And what does it
mean for the future?—also function as guideposts and boundary markers for what follows.
To attempt to answer these questions, I will consider the writings of Polybius of
Megalopolis (c. 200 BC – c. 118 BC) and those of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) on the
subject of Roman virtue, drawing on the major works of each author. I will examine the
arguments and conclusions of each writer in parallel fashion, since both discuss the concept of
virtue quite extensively by highlighting the conduct of specific Roman citizens, as well as by
analyzing the Roman constitution and the wider culture from which it arose. The first section of
this paper will set out the life and historical milieu of Polybius, outline his major contributions to
the field of history, and end with an extended discussion of his conception of and thoughts on the
idea of virtue in the Republican Roman context. The second portion will function much the same
way, beginning with a brief biographical sketch of Machiavelli, listing his significant works and
those under consideration in this paper, and conclude with an examination of the theme of
Roman virtue as it emerged in his writings. In the third and final segment of the paper, I will
undertake a comparison of various elements of each author’s argument, offer my analysis of their

differing conclusions, and close with some short remarks on the historian’s purpose of
considering ideas in history.
Regarding sources, primary materials are by far the most often referenced for support
throughout the paper, though secondary books and articles have provided valuable insights and
served to situate each author more clearly in his respective historical context.1 Chief among these
were Eckstein’s Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius, Sacks’s Polybius on the Writing of
History, Kristeller’s Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, and Skinner’s Machiavelli’s Virtue.
Finally, I am indebted to the guidance of professors Dean, Lowe, and Van Heemst in the
preparation of this paper. Without them, this project would undoubtedly have remained an idea
never set to paper.

Robin Waterfield’s translation of Polybius’s Histories is the version referenced throughout the
paper. For Machiavelli’s Discourses and The Prince, I relied on the version by Ninian Hill
Thomson (full citations located in bibliography).
1
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Chapter One
The Greco-Roman: the life and works of Polybius of Megalopolis
Born between 198 and 203 BC in Megalopolis, a city in west-central Arcadia, Polybius’s
life was shaped from the start by his family’s aristocratic station. Polybius’s father, Lycortas,
was a prominent official among the leadership of the Achaean League, and from a young age, his
son appeared destined for a career as a politician and diplomat. Notable among the
accomplishments on the young Polybius’s resume was his role in bearing the ashes of
Philopoemen in the latter’s funeral procession.2 No small honor, this: Philopoemen had been an
eight-time strategos (a kind of elected general-in-chief with formidable executive powers) of the
League who had humbled the vaunted Spartan military at Mantinea in 207 BC. Though familial
connections certainly had something to do with Polybius’s part in the city’s remembrance of that
hero, the poetic value of a young man who was to become one of the greatest historians of
antiquity carrying the ashes of an influential figure in Mediterranean affairs is not something to
be missed. Building on his parentage and education, when he came of age, Polybius was elected
hipparchus (literally ‘cavalry commander,’ though the office was as much administrative as one
of battlefield command, assisting the strategos) of the League in 170, apparently the perfect
entry point into a life of political and military influence.3
However secure his fortunes may have been, Polybius’s life was changed forever by a
series of wars between several major Mediterranean powers: rising Rome, the pedigreed
Hellenistic kingdom of Macedon, and the powerful Seleucid state. During these conflicts, Greece

2

Polybius, The Histories, translated by Robin Waterfield, with introduction & notes by Brian
McGing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), introduction, x.
3
Arthur M. Eckstein, Moral Vision in The Histories of Polybius (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1995), 4.

3

under the Achaean League was nominally allied with Rome, although over the course of those
wars there emerged in Greece several parties favoring “various shades of acquiescence” to the
Roman agenda, with evidence pointing to Polybius and his father as among the least enthusiastic
about Roman dominance.4 This fragmented domestic political situation may account for the fact
that no Greek troops fought with Roman forces in the major engagements of the wars with
Macedon, with the Seleucids, or in the second round of fighting with the son of the previous
Macedonian belligerent. In any case, in the aftermath of Rome’s victory, several of the more
outspoken pro-Roman Greek leaders were instrumental in securing the deportation of their own
(ostensibly Rome’s) enemies who were somewhat less wholehearted about their support for the
rising star of Roman imperialism.
Polybius was one of these approximately 1,000 hostage-exiles sent to Rome, arriving in
168 BC, and was rather quickly (though the details are a bit vague)5 able to connect himself with
the family of the great Aemilius Paullus, the commander who had so famously defeated
Hannibal at Zama in the wars of the previous generation. Through this friendship, Polybius grew
close to Paullus’ sons, Quintus Fabius Maximus and Scipio Aemilianus, becoming a particularly
intimate friend of the later. It seems that despite his exiled status, he was after all, aristocratic,
educated, rich, and Greek—in other words, a perfect example of the culture from which his
imperial hosts were forever borrowing. Polybius remained close to the family for many years,
and it was his relationship to Scipio that afforded him many of the opportunities to provide
information with himself as an eyewitness that later enriched his Histories and other writings.6 In
his time at Rome, Polybius became involved with the intricacies of Italian politics (no doubt
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drawing on his own experience as Achaean hipparch before his exile), and continued to gather
firsthand information from and about prominent figures in Mediterranean affairs.7
Polybius remained in Rome and its environs, making acquaintances with others of similar
background and completing a large part of his magnum opus, The Histories, until in 150, the
Roman Senate allowed those Greek hostages still alive to return to the various towns and cities
from which they had been expelled nearly two decades before. Polybius duly traveled home,
after seventeen years as a political prisoner, albeit one with broad freedom of movement and the
ability to research and write, not to mention having made a name for himself among the Roman
elite through a position as a political advisor. Soon after arriving back in Achaea, however, war
with Carthage loomed, and Polybius traveled back to Rome to accompany his friend Scipio
Aemilianus—now a military tribune being sent to a command in Spain—in what became known
as the Third Punic War. Scipio’s skills in battle eventually won him the consulship and thus
command of the force that besieged and sacked Carthage in 146, with Polybius present as an
eyewitness. After the Roman victory, Polybius returned to Rome (having retraced the invasion
route taken by Hannibal from Spain over the Pyrenees, Alps, and into Italy during the Second
Punic War), and finally made his way back to Megalopolis in 145 or 144, perhaps with the
intention of resuming his long-interrupted political career.8
On his return to Achaea, however, Polybius learned that the League and Rome had gone
to war and after their victory, the Romans—among whom he had spent so long, becoming
intimately familiar with Roman political and military practices—were behaving almost as
odiously in victory over the Greeks as they had towards thrice-recalcitrant Carthage, a threat an
order of magnitude greater than that posed by the Greek states. Still an Achaean to his bones,
7
8
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Polybius promptly traveled back to Rome in the winter of 145 to 144 where he leveraged his
political experience and personal connections to alleviate some of the more onerous elements of
the enforced peace, including taking pains to halt Roman looting of various Achaean statues and
other cultural items.9 After this venture, the events of Polybius’s later life grow increasingly dim,
though it is apparent from remarks by contemporaries (Livy especially, who used The Histories
liberally as a source in his own historical writings) and in The Histories themselves that Polybius
eventually completed this, his most famous work, while remaining at Megalopolis.
As we shall see from comments he himself makes in The Histories about the importance
of an active life if one is to write history of value, it is reasonable to assume that Polybius
remained prominent in Greek (possibly Greco-Roman) political affairs in his later years. It also
seems that Polybius maintained an active lifestyle, perhaps a combination of a desire to make up
for lost time while at Rome and a holdover from his experiences on campaign in Spain and
Africa with Scipio. While the details of his later years and the circumstances of his death remain
opaque in terms of definite historical testimony, the tradition of his death at eighty-two years old
from—of all possible causes of death for an octogenarian—complications after a fall from his
horse seems wholly in keeping with his character as it emerges in better-attested periods of his
life.

Virtue and excellence: Roman virtue in The Histories of Polybius
After his death, Polybius was honored in Greece with a statue and several inscriptions,10
more in reference to his actions in securing more tolerable conditions for the defeated Achaean
cities than (predictably) out of gratitude for his accomplishments as a multi-disciplinary scholar
9
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and historian of the Roman state. Yet for all his experience as a political and military advisor,
Polybius is today remembered mostly as an historian’s historian, given to frequent digressions on
topics as far-flung as geography and philosophy, and rather a bore to read when compared with
other Roman chroniclers.11 The first two observations are true enough, for although Polybius was
single-minded in his chosen project of tracing the origins and methods by which “in less than
fifty-three years” Rome succeeded in conquering “almost the entire known world,” that
earnestness led him to discuss at length the complexities of human motivation and behavior
behind and beneath the more straightforward historical realities of dates, events, wars, and
treaties.12 Indeed, in Polybius, more so than in any of his predecessors Herodotus, Xenophon, or
Thucydides, we see for the first time the development of a truly universal history, which led him
to explore more abstract topics than are usually discussed in historical writings precisely because
of their influence on the rise and conduct of Rome, which was to him the most remarkable state
to arise in the known world.
Unfortunately, though not unexpectedly, the bulk of Polybius’s works have suffered the
same fate as countless other texts from antiquity. Of The Histories, his masterwork in forty
books, now only books one through five are extant in their entirety, accompanied by large
passages of book six and fragments of book twelve, with the others known only through
Polybius’s own remarks and references in his contemporaries. More grievous still is the utter loss
of all of his other works, which included a treatise on military tactics, a work of geography, and a
biography of the Achaean hero Philopoemen. For these, too, their existence is only known
through passing references in The Histories and notes in later authors, especially Livy (59 BC –
11
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17 AD). While this loss presents significant difficulties in assessing the literary merits of the
Polybian corpus, for the purposes of this section, I will focus on those books of The Histories
still extant since, as the author’s main work, they represent the fullest and best source of his
scholarly and personal views on the rise and legacy of the Roman state. Selections from Livy’s
The History of Rome will be of some limited use, as Livy had access to the complete text of The
Histories and drew heavily on Polybius’s work as a source for his own historical writings.
Despite Polybius’s previously mentioned unattractive literary qualities, since the advent
of the early modern period, he has been mined variously as a source for tactical and technical
military data in the 16th and 17th centuries; for his contributions as an important political theorist
in the 18th; and as an authoritative source for early Roman history in the 19th.13 While The
Histories do indeed represent a valuable repository of information on various aspects of specific
Roman institutions in the years from 220 to 146 BC, their chief worth lies in their status as an
attempt by a learned, experienced writer to detail and explain the reasons for the rise and
continued vitality of the most successful state in Mediterranean history. Viewed in this light,
Polybius’s inclusion of what is often viewed as secondary and tertiary material (as it seems to
deviate from his declared subject matter) in truth represents the complexity of his analysis of the
source of Roman strength.
Throughout The Histories, Polybius refers to Roman virtue as a key element enabling
their dominance of other powerful Mediterranean powers, shown in the following description:
Whenever a notable Roman dies, as part of the funeral proceedings he is carried in great
splendor to the . . . Forum. With all the people standing around [an adult son or other
relative] . . . delivers a speech in praise of the dead man’s virtues and his exploits during

13

Eckstein, Moral Vision, 17.
8

his lifetime. This acts as a vivid reminder of the facts for the assembled people, whether
or not they had been directly affected by his achievements, and they become so moved
that the loss seems to be everyone’s in common, not just a private family matter.
Afterwards . . . they set up an icon of the dead man [and it] consists of a mask that has
been moulded and made up, to a remarkably exact likeness . . . Whenever a notable
family member dies, they take them out for the funeral procession and put them on those
who... bear the closest resemblance to the dead men . . . It is harder to imagine a finer
sight for an ambitious young man who aspires to excellence . . . [Since] the most
important thing is that young men are inspired to heroic feats of endurance, in order to
gain the fame that accrues to the brave.14
Admittedly, the above quotation is not necessarily the most famous section on the subject
of Roman institutional virtue, and of course, the Republican Romans were certainly not the only
Mediterranean people to hold elaborate funeral ceremonies. Indeed, Polybius’s own role as the
young son of a Greek nobleman in carrying the ashes of the Hellenic hero Philopoemen so many
years before is evidence of this. Nevertheless, Polybius was surely correct to point out that the
Roman tradition of publicly remembering their honored dead and vividly retelling the deeds of
illustrious ancestors did much to predispose their young men to the great deeds they were
expected to perform in the next generation of Roman imperial ventures.
A better-known exposition of the virtues of the Roman state is found in Polybius’s
comparison of the constitutions and political practices of several Mediterranean polities,
allowing the author to test the structure of Roman governance against the practices of Athens,
Thebes, Crete, and Sparta. Instead of a straight point-by-point analysis of each with Roman
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political structures, Polybius adopts a genealogical approach toward the development of the nowfamous three types of good government and their three “congenital vices:” kingship and
monarchy; aristocracy and oligarchy; democracy and mob rule. 15 In keeping with his chosen
scope of universal history, he begins by detailing the evolution of early human “bands” headed
by the “strongest and most aggressive man among them” into monarchy, equivalent to a tyranny
or dictatorship, since the “determinant of these men’s rulership was their strength.”16 As humans
began to develop value systems, they turned to their monarchs to be the guarantors of law
through reason. Thus, argues Polybius, monarchy changed into kingship, which was handed
down as a position consisting of both leadership of and service to one’s subjects. However, as
kings became accustomed to absolute authority and the trappings thereof, they began to distance
themselves from the people at large, sowing the seeds of discontent. Moreover, as both moral
corruption and monarchic abuses of power multiplied, so too did the wealthiest and most
powerful of the king’s subjects grow more restive.
As the socio-economic group immediately beneath the monarch rose up in revolt, they
instituted the second type of good government, aristocracy. By ruling in concert, this newly
empowered class more effectively “made the common good their top priority” than had the
single ruler of the once-lauded kingship. Inevitably, peace and stability led to the breakdown of
the moral character of the new ruling class, eventually degenerating into rule by what amounted
to a licentious criminal organization: an oligarchy. After a period of “unrest and disgust” with the
conduct of the aristocrats-turned-oligarchs, Polybius envisioned an uprising of the general
populace and, having “murdered or banished” the offenders, with the citizenry undertaking to
rewrite their constitution, assuming “administrative duties and responsibilities themselves.” Once
15
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more, after several generations had grown to maturity and had begun to take for granted the
freedoms of democratic rule, the concern for good governance and general morality that led to
the institution of democracy in the first place were increasingly abandoned as citizens of wealth
and influence manipulated the populace into granting them power rivaling that of monarchs or
oligarchs. At last, as these excesses became unbearable to those few still possessed of their
morality, Polybius imagined a descent into civil war, accompanied by rounds of retributive
violence and arbitrary land redistribution, until a single ‘strong man’ arose to begin the whole
process again.17
Having thus traced the cycle by which the history and future of most states can be
charted, Polybius returned to his plan of examining the merits of the Roman constitution
alongside those of other Mediterranean powers. Beginning—naturally enough—in Greece with
Thebes and Athens, he matter-of-factly stated: “the Thebans’ reputation for excellence . . . was
actually due just to one or two outstanding individuals . . . not to their system of government.”18
Polybius went on to argue that the prominence of Thebes was so short-lived because it was due
only to the brilliance of two Theban generals, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, both of whom scored
stunningly one-sided victories over the legendary Spartan army in the mid-4th century BC.
Despite their successes, less than thirty years after their deaths, Thebes—indeed, independent
Greece—was no more, having been annexed by Alexander of Macedon. Polybius, at least, held
the truth of his argument self-evident, in light of Thebes’ meteoric rise and equally rapid fall.
Having dispensed with Thebes, Polybius next turned his attention to the more famous
Athenian democracy and constitution, drawing a similar conclusion:

17
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“[Although] one might claim that Athens enjoyed several periods of success, none was
more glorious than the one that coincided with Themistocles at the height of his powers,
and shortly afterwards the inherent inconsistency of the constitution ensured that Athens
suffered a complete reversal.”19
In simplest terms, he faulted the very democratic Athenian institutions so revered by others as
chief among the causes of the many Athenian setbacks, citing the ability of demagogues to so
easily sway the passions of the citizenry into ill-fated ventures.20 In the same vein, he criticized
the excesses of Cretan democracy, though the problem in Crete was not unregulated politicking
but unfettered avarice. According to Polybius, nowhere else in Greece at the time was the
acquisition of wealth and land such a high priority, since “[Crete] is the only place in the world
where no gain of any kind is considered sordid.” And, in the very next sentence: “Moreover,
political offices are filled there on an annual basis by democratic procedures.”21
Surprisingly, given the weakness of democracies to the demagoguery of charismatic
leaders, and their demonstrable susceptibility to the corrupting influence of wealth, Polybius did
not turn to analyzing hypothetical governments. For this historian—practical to a fault when it
came to political institutions—unless a political system had actually been tried, a discussion of
its merits and faults was not a topic for a work of political history such as his, thus allowing him
to neatly dispose of the issue of Plato’s ideal state and others like it. Instead, after finding the
political structures of Thebes, Athens, and Crete wanting, Polybius quickly moved on to what he
viewed as the true predecessor of the manifestly successful Roman system: the Spartan
19
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constitution. Under the scheme instituted by the fabled early ruler Lycurgus, equal land allotment
among all Spartan citizens coupled with social emphases on simple living, the strengths of the
community, and general piety all contributed to eliminating the race for material enrichment and
chronic political instability which plagued Thebes, Athens, and Crete.
Yet the Spartan system, which apparently combined the merits of the three types of good
governance through rule by a Council of Elders, suffrage for landed males who had attained an
age of majority, and leadership by a king, also had a glaring defect. That is, the Spartans took
advantage of their domestic political stability to aggressively expand their influence in the
Peloponnese at the expense of their neighbors. This lust for power was what eventually led to
their downfall, since in seeking the funds and allies necessary for extended campaigning, the
Spartans managed to anger other powerful Greek states, triggering the destructive Peloponnesian
War with the widespread subsequent exhaustion working to pave the way for conquest by
Alexander of Macedon. For Polybius, the chief failure of the Spartan constitution was that it was
essentially conservative, aimed at preserving the status quo of Spartan autonomy as a polity,
without the flexibility required to support extended Spartan rule over a variety of conquered
peoples.22
Before moving on to Polybius’s exposition of the merits of the Roman constitution, some
of his remarks in the opening of Book Six bear treatment. He began that book by reminding his
readers that his overarching goal was to show “how, and thanks to what kind of political system,
an unprecedented event occurred—the conquest of almost all the known world in roughly fifty
years, and its submission to just one ruler, Rome.”23 Thus, Polybius justified his project of
constructing a universal history, which by its nature necessitates his occasional digressions on
22
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causality, morality, and other more abstract concepts. The opening of book six also reveals why
he gave such importance to the political foundations of a polity, as government forms the
“wellspring, so to speak, which not only gives rise to all plans and practical initiatives but also
brings them to fulfillment.”24
It is from such a perspective, then, that Polybius undertook his analysis of the Roman
constitution against its Greek predecessors. On the surface, Roman government combined the
three best forms of government in the executive office of the consuls, the aristocratic assembly of
the Senate, and the areas of responsibility for the general citizenry, as in the Spartan system. In
the Roman case, however, each of the two consuls held power for one year only and returned to
their previous careers after their terms were complete, thereby avoiding many of the excesses
inherent in a system of lifelong, inherited kingship. These executive officials were responsible
for raising and commanding armies, oversaw relations between Rome and the Italian allies, and
were empowered to use the state treasury as they saw fit. In other words, they were “entirely
responsible for carrying out the Senate’s decrees,” apparently giving them nearly unlimited
powers over the operation of the state, especially in wartime.25
Turning to the Senate, the author informed his readers that that assembly of
representatives from Rome’s oldest aristocratic families was empowered to declare war, draw up
treaties, receive or turn away foreign envoys, and draft legislation. Speaking more broadly of
senatorial responsibilities, Polybius maintained that the most important was its management of
the state treasury, since neither could war be waged nor could the numerous public building
projects be undertaken without Senatorial approval. Though between the roles of the Senate and
the consuls it appeared that little remained for Roman citizens to weigh in on, Polybius argued
24
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that in fact, the role of the citizenry was actually the most important of the three, since they
“controlled rewards and punishments . . . [And] without them human life has no coherence, let
alone governments and constitutions.”26 Practically speaking, it fell to citizens to ratify treaties
and other legislation presented by the Senate, to approve sentences of those convicted of capital
offences or those who committed crimes while in high office, and to appoint from among
themselves men to serve as tribunes who accompanied the consuls in their endeavors as
representatives of the wishes of the populace.
Having outlined the basics of Roman governance, Polybius next analyzed the machinery
of the Republic in times of both war and peace with the aim of demonstrating its dynamism and
vitality. In wartime, while the consul had sole power to prosecute the war, to summon allies, and
other strategic matters, approval for necessary provisions, weapons, and other matériel had to
come from the Senate, thereby checking what could otherwise be warped into a military
dictatorship. Finally, since it fell ultimately to the people to approve or reject treaties or truces at
war’s end, a consul’s time in the field was directly influenced by the decision of the general
populace. Further, after a consul completed his term, he underwent an “audit by the people of his
conduct while in office,” and was thus well served to bear always in mind both the opinion of the
citizenry and the Senate as he went about the business of administration and command.27
As for the operation of the Republic during times of peace, Polybius restricted his
analysis to a series of statements that demonstrate to the reader the futility of an attempt by one
26
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of the three aspects—democratic, aristocratic, or monarchic—to seize and hold sole power. For
example, if a campaign or war had been won, processions—“triumphs, as they [the Romans] call
them”—were commonly held to celebrate the merits of the Roman official who oversaw the
victory. Yet these were nearly impossible to finance or organize without the backing of the
Senate and its approval of the use of state funds, allowing the Senate to curtail the influence of a
consul they felt had grown too great. The Senate, too, must mind the populace, since if it
attempted to pass legislation not in keeping with the wishes of the citizenry, those laws went
unapproved and the Senate was left without a substantial portion of its power. Finally, the people
were kept from ignoring the Senate as the authority of that assembly extended primarily into the
oversight of civil, criminal, and capital lawsuits as well as into the drafting of economic
legislation. Likewise, the citizenry were discouraged from disobeying the wishes of the consuls,
since “everyone, both individually and collectively, [fell] under their authority when out on
campaign.”28
With a structure and tone reminiscent of Polybius’s above-mentioned remarks at the
outset of Book Six, the preface of his section outlining the machinery of Roman governance
bears closer examination for the author’s views on the nature and importance of Roman virtue.
To begin with, Polybius chose not one of the Greek polities as a foil for the excellence of Roman
institutions, but instead selected her chief Mediterranean rival during the Republican period: the
powerful maritime state of Carthage. Applying the genealogical paradigm of cyclical political
structures to the city-state, Polybius judged a major source of Punic weakness and conversely,
Roman success, to be that the Carthaginians were further advanced in the birth-growth-death
political ‘life cycle’ than were the Romans at the time of what came to be known as the First
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Punic War, fought between 264-241 BC. While Rome emerged victorious from this first conflict,
Carthaginian strength appeared dangerously resurgent a generation later, embodied in the
strategic and tactical brilliance of Hannibal Barca.
The fact that this Carthaginian general, who managed to invade Italy by crossing the
Alps, scored four crushing defeats against sizable Roman armies, and remained undefeated on
Roman soil for a more than a decade, did not break the Roman will to resist is emphasized by
Polybius as a testament to the vitality and resilience of the Republican system. The Romans
simply elected new consuls and tribunes, raised new armies, and changed their tactics, eventually
electing an equally talented Roman commander—with a battle-plan influenced by Hannibal’s
own victories in Spain and Italy—who eventually brought the fearsome Punic warlord to defeat
on the plains of Zama outside Carthage in 202 BC, ending the war on terms overwhelmingly
favorable to Rome. The magnitude of the Roman victory put off Carthaginian power for another
generation, but when a third war broke out in 149 BC, the Romans laid siege to and sacked the
city mercilessly, an event the author himself bore witness to in 146 BC. A second proof of
Roman dominance of the Mediterranean—and certainly the more personally distressing of the
two for the author—was the suppression of a revolt by recalcitrant Achaean cities, punctuated by
the sack of Corinth, also in 146 BC.
Revealing, though, is the fact that throughout the narrative of repeated Punic defeat at the
hands of successive generations of Romans, Polybius did not mete out the same level of harsh
criticism to the Carthaginian state as he did to the above-examined Greek polities, including
Sparta. Carthage was an important Mediterranean power, but in simplest terms, its time
(referring again to the political genealogy model) had come and gone, a fact signaled by the three
Roman triumphs over it. And as those triumphs meant the end of an independent Carthage, able
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to contend with other powerful maritime states around the Mediterranean, so too did they herald
the ascendancy of Rome, a polity whose excellence in political structures fostered a culture of
public and private virtue such that for centuries and into the foreseeable future (for Polybius,
anyway), its imperial aims proved irresistible by virtually every other culture with which it came
into contact.
In sum, despite the paucity of source material, the extant books of The Histories preserve
a sufficient amount of Polybius’s arguments that the his view of the source of Roman virtue can
be reconstructed along the following lines. Having passed through the genealogical stages of
social disorder followed by a traditional kingship, the Romans managed to piece together a
rugged and flexible system of governance that largely avoided the mistakes of any of the three
‘pure’ forms of rule. This system also overcame a conservative emphasis on the status quo at the
expense of the dynamism required to maintain an expansionist state (the greatest weakness of the
Spartan system). In socio-cultural terms, Polybius credited the Roman customs of communal
celebration of their honored dead with elaborate funeral practices and familial veneration of
deceased relatives as powerful tools with engendering the kind of popular fortitude and civil
service that enabled the Republic to survive the strains of rapid geographic expansion and the
pressure of repeated, costly military reversal.
Thus, the virtue of the Roman people, which gave rise to and was thus embodied in the
political structures of the Republic, was the reason responsible more than any other for the
subjection of “almost all the known world . . . to just one ruler, Rome.”29 More importantly, this
cultural trait—manifest in political institutions—actually justified contemporary Roman
dominance, since Republican Rome was in effect bringing other, less sophisticated peoples under
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a mutually beneficial protectorate, not arbitrarily imposing rule by a single despot or a small
class of wealthy citizens. In simplest terms, then, the Roman state (as Polybius knew it)
achieved, maintained, and deserved its rule because of its virtuous political institutions.
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Chapter Two
The Florentine: The Life and Works of Niccolò Machiavelli
Born in 1469 into a Florentine family with modest land holdings but dwindling financial
means, Niccolò Machiavelli nonetheless received an excellent education in the humanities, as
befitting a son of one of the leading creative centers of the burgeoning Italian Renaissance.
Doubly blessed as a precocious and pragmatic student, Machiavelli was appointed to an
important post in the Florentine municipal bureaucracy before his thirtieth birthday. He then
spent the period from 1498 to 1513 as a civil servant of his native city, which afforded him many
opportunities to observe firsthand the themes and techniques about which he later famously
wrote. Entrusted to a number of “important diplomatic missions... [He] was sent to France on
four occasions... to the papal court twice,” and also spent time among the retinues of Cesare
Borgia and Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I.30
More than just a keen observer or talented bureaucrat, Machiavelli was not only able to
successfully navigate the labyrinthine international political environment of the day, but also had
the opportunity to showcase his pragmatism in persuading the ruler of Florence to allow him to
raise and train a citizen militia. A man of action and varied talents all his days, Machiavelli
engaged in everything from personally directing Florentine forces in the field during actions
against the city of Pisa to penning a bitingly satirical play and works of fiction/political
commentary in his later years. In all, the course of Machiavelli’s personal life as well as his
political experiences combined to produce a man eminently qualified for working through the
matters of statecraft he addressed in The Prince and the Discourses.
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The year 1513 brought a political sea change to government of Florence, and despite his
record of service and personal skills, Machiavelli was swept from his post by the retributive
decrees of the ascendant Medici party, a process quite common in Italian politics of the 15th
century. The Medici, previously expelled during the upheaval incited in 1494 by the incendiary
Dominican monk Savonarola, successfully returned to power in Florence and proceeded to
abolish the republican institutions set up during Savonarola’s reforms. Machiavelli, as a
prominent official of the now-defunct Florentine republic, was accused of plotting against the
Medici and summarily imprisoned and tortured. Fortunately, after a period of several weeks, the
charges against him were dropped, and Machiavelli went to live on a farm owned by his family
in the hills outside the city.
Despite the personal misfortunes that led to his semi-exile, it was during that fourteenyear period that Machiavelli penned the books for which he is best known, The Prince and his
Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius, in addition to several other works. He
described this period of his life at length in the following terms, excerpted from a letter to a
friend:
On the coming of evening, I return to my house and enter my study; and at the door I take
off the day’s clothing, covered with mud and dust, and put on garments regal and courtly;
and reclothed appropriately, I enter the ancient courts of ancient men, where, received by
them with affection, I feed on the food which is only mine and which I was born for,
where I am not ashamed to speak with them and to ask them the reason for their actions;
and they in their kindness answer me; and for four hours of time I do not feel boredom, I
forget every trouble, I do not dread poverty, [and] I am not frightened by death . . . .31
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Machiavelli continued to petition his friends along with a range of secular and ecclesiastic
officials to the end of securing his old position in the Florentine government. Yet despite his
efforts (and the eventual thawing of relations between the Medici and himself), he never
regained a role comparable to the key post he had once held. In spite of the frustration of his
political ambitions, Machiavelli remained a man of affairs until his death in 1527, even leading a
military action against a neighboring city on behalf of Florence as late as 1525.
One could surmise that Machiavelli died quite unpopular, known only within a small
circle of pro-republican Florentine intellectuals, never having recouped the losses inflicted on his
career by the return of the Medici, with his most famous works generally ignored in his own
lifetime. The Prince was indeed placed on the Index some years after his death, never having
been sent to the Medici official to whom it was dedicated. In fact, Machiavelli’s cenotaph under
his statue in the Basilica di Santa Croce di Firenze reads “no eulogy (would be appropriate to) so
great a name,” suggesting his other publications (including a history of the city of Florence,
completed in 1525) attained a level of popular appeal not reached by his works of history and
political science. In all, despite the misunderstanding and negative reception surrounding his
now-famous works, it seems that Machiavelli died a well-remembered son of his native city,
commemorated for his civil service as well as his other literary contributions.

Echoes of Rome: Virtue and Statecraft in Antiquity
Since the publication of his most famous works (The Prince posthumously and the
Discourses at the end of his life), literary critics, political thinkers, philosophers, historians, and
mainline ecclesiastic officials have denounced, praised, imitated, adapted, satirized, and analyzed
nearly every aspect of the Machiavelli’s writings. Since the late 16th century, readers of
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Machiavelli have also applied the label of ‘Machiavellian’ to a person—often, though not
exclusively, in political circles—who is ruthless and amoral in pursuing his or her goals. 32 The
particularly incendiary opinions advanced in The Prince even earned it a place on the papal
Index exactly three decades after Machiavelli’s death, and the interpretation of the range of
influential conclusions Machiavelli put forth will doubtless remain a dynamic scholarly
battlefield for the foreseeable future.
My own interest in Machiavelli’s thought is much more limited, however. In the
following pages, I plan to examine the theme of political virtue—if it existed, what it was, and
how it was to be duplicated—in the political institutions of the Roman Republic as Machiavelli
saw them. As his best-known works, The Prince and the Discourses on the First Decade of Titus
Livy will form my primary source material on this topic. A range of secondary books and articles
from Burckhardt’s classic piece, “The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy,” to more recent
scholarly contributions to the field will function as contextual material to Machiavelli’s own
writings.
To Machiavelli, sitting in his study and communing with the luminaries of Mediterranean
antiquity after a day’s work, histories of the Roman Republic preserved a wealth of knowledge
about politics and society. From that perspective, Machiavelli’s selection of topic must have
seemed an obvious one: the Roman state represented an eight century-long height of cultural and
political achievement not approached during the medieval period and unrivaled even in his own
day. In addition to his chief subject, in the Discourses and The Prince, Machiavelli also
examined—however briefly— other Mediterranean states for their value either as foils to the
political pragmatism of Rome or as predecessors to it. In The Prince, Machiavelli dealt primarily
32

Wootton, David, ed. Modern Political Thought: Readings from Machiavelli to Nietzsche, 2nd
edition (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2008), 2.
23

with the foundations and facets of authoritarian government, with constant reference to Roman
as well as contemporary exemplars like the ruthless Cesare Borgia and Julius II, the “Warrior
Pope.” Written several years later, the Discourses were, on the surface, presented as
commentaries on the first ten books of Roman historian Livy’s Discourses on the Roman
Republic. On a deeper level, though, Machiavelli wove into his analysis of Livy’s conclusions a
paean celebrating the strengths and virtues of republican governance apparently at odds with his
forthright acceptance of autocracy in The Prince.33 The task of reconciling Machiavelli’s
apparent endorsement of autocratic rule in The Prince and his love of republicanism on display
in the Discourses continues to present a challenge to scholars.34 I will attempt address this issue
more fully below, but for now suffice it to say that I believe the two works do not present
competing but in fact mutually compatible points of view, if examined with contemporary Italian
and Machiavelli’s personal contexts in mind.
Unlike the philosophers who, from Plato to Cicero, fashioned ideal social and political
structures with ultimate goodness as their goal, Machiavelli dispensed with purely theoretical
governments and analyzed only those societies that had actually existed, from the Greek poleis to
the Roman state. This approach in itself was not new, for writers in the Thucidydean tradition
had ever made the workings of concrete historical and political realities their central focus.
Machiavelli positioned himself squarely in that methodology, for what fascinated “him was how
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the problems of politics had remained unchanged for the last two thousand years.”35 Coming to
the heart of the matter, Machiavelli justified the adoption of such an approach in the following
terms:
[It] seems to me better to follow the real truth of things than an imaginary view of them.
For many Republics and Princedoms have been imagined that were never seen or known
to exist in reality. And the manner in which we live, and that in which we ought to live,
are so wide asunder, that . . . any one who would act up to a perfect standard of goodness
in everything must be ruined among so many who are not good. It is essential, therefore,
for a Prince who desires to maintain his position, to have learned how to be other than
good, and to use or not to use his goodness as necessity requires.36
Therefore, by delving deep into the histories of the Roman Republic, he planned to not
only discover why and how the Roman state came to rule an empire of immense size and wealth
for nearly eight hundred years but also to plot a political course that would function as a parallel
and mirror of Roman success in his own time. In place of flowery passages praising the glories
and goodness of Roman rule, a certain pragmatism, bordering on ruthlessness, marked the
‘heroes’ of most of Machiavelli’s works, with that theme coming to the fore most (in)famously
in The Prince. Indeed, Machiavelli’s emphasis on stable rule and social order in The Prince—
addressed differently though no less ardently in the Discourses—at the expense of personal
morality, enforced through the unwavering application of force was what led to his caricatured
portrayal in the decades after his death as a sinister schemer in favor of any and all means to
achieve and consolidate political power.
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In reality, Machiavelli espoused the sentiments expressed in the above quote and admired
such men as Cesare Borgia because he thought that the ends of all political activity should be to
consolidate and maintain power so that peace, stability, and order may be established and
preserved. Power was not an end in itself; rulers who abused their position through cruelty and
personal avarice as well as those who were unable to keep order (whether the disruption was
domestic uprising or foreign incursion) were to be despised equally, for both betrayed the
primary purpose for the office they held. At its core, the motivation for Machiavelli’s choice of
the Roman state as the avatar of virtue in the political sphere lay in the ability of its institutions
to create and maintain stability in times of war and peace and in periods of intense imperial
expansion as well as eras when the borders were relatively static.
The relationship of violence to political efficacy was very close, in Machiavelli’s thought,
and he mined Roman history for examples on both sides of the question of “whether it is better to
be loved or feared.”37 On one hand, the general Hannibal Barca, in whose army “no dissension
ever arose . . . against their leader, either in his good or his evil fortunes. This we can only
ascribe to the [cruelty] which, joined with numberless great qualities, rendered him . . . venerable
and terrible in the eyes of his soldiers.”38 On the other end of the spectrum lay the conduct of the
troops of Hannibal’s opponent, Scipio, whose “armies rose against him in Spain from no other
cause than his too great a leniency in allowing them a freedom inconsistent with military
strictness.”39
The fact that Scipio was the eventual victor in the wider Roman-Carthaginian conflict
seemed to have been of little importance to Machiavelli. It is reasonable to assume that, future
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victory aside, had Scipio been a general more ‘venerable and terrible’ in the estimation of his
soldiers, Hannibal’s fifteen year-long war of attrition on Italian soil may have been ended much
more quickly instead of the conclusion of the war being put off until the battle at Zama in 201
BC. In the same way, Hannibal’s well-documented cruelty—sentencing captured Romans to a
tortuously slow death by exposure and starvation, for example—was justified because without it,
he would likely not have been remembered in the annals of military history as one of the greatest
commanders the world has ever known, achieving victories against the vaunted Roman legions
scarcely equaled before or since.
There hardly exists a clearer example of several of Machiavelli’s foundational themes to
which he returns time and again in The Prince. First, Machiavelli was careful to portray the
conduct of Hannibal versus that of Scipio as an exception to the rule, as it took a strategic
virtuoso with very few peers in the annals of military history to overcome the flexible and
resilient Roman martial tradition. For proof of that exception, one must only look to the overall
history of the Second Punic War. Even after suffering several catastrophic defeats and repeated
changes of overall military command, the triumph belonged ultimately to Rome, due in no small
part to the resilience of its military and political institutions and the resolve of its soldiery and
general populace. Taking the opposite tack, after suffering a number of military reverses near the
end of the First Punic War, instead of a citizen army gathering strength from a dangerous enemy
on its own soil, the (mostly mercenary) troops of Carthage mutinied and actually attacked the
city of their employer, despite the fact that they were led by Carthaginian citizens.40
Second, Machiavelli’s harsh judgment of Scipio showed his commitment to the idea that
in times of conflict, the best course of action consisted of the overwhelming application of
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maximum force to bring about the return of peace and stability as rapidly as possible. Scipio’s
lax discipline led to the mutiny of his troops, drastically decreasing their combat effectiveness
and thus prolonging the war unnecessarily. Such a doctrine was applicable to domestic and civil
disturbances as well, for in constructing his state, a Prince was to “lay a solid foundation” by
maintaining “good laws and good arms.”41 Support for these laws came from the creation and
maintenance of a robust, permanent national army modeled after the ancient states of Rome and
Sparta, the “armed and free” states of antiquity, as well as after the contemporary Swiss
confederation, the population of which is “at once the best armed and freest . . . in the world.”42
Machiavelli addressed the same theme with greater respect to the historical development
of Roman political institutions in the Discourses, largely by shifting his perspective from
individual examples to a wider view of the Roman state as a whole. In the opening few chapters,
he described at length the condition of the Roman state while in its monarchical stage (as it had
been set up in the distant past) as possessed of basically good laws. But, when the state
transitioned to a commonwealth under the Senate, it was found “wanting [several provisions]
which in the interest of liberty it was necessary to supply, since [the ancient kings] had not
supplied them.”43 These characteristics were provided for by the creation of the consular posts,
the temporary, electoral nature of which embodied the spirit and authority of the kingship
without the potential for abuse of sole power and succession-centered instability, both of which
so often accompanied lifelong, hereditary rule.
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Despite the positive influence of the addition of the consuls, Machiavelli still believed the
Republic to be in a transitional period of relative instability until the creation of the offices of the
tribunes. Elected from among the general populace, these officials acted as ombudsmen on
behalf of the citizenry to check any potential ignorance of their wishes by either the powerful
consuls or the affluent, well-connected Senators.44 Machiavelli found an opportunity to expand
on his idea of the relationship of good laws and good arms in the offices of the tribunes, which
were able to stop Senate from trampling or ignoring the good of the commons in legislative and
diplomatic matters. Further, at least one tribune always accompanied the consuls in the field on
during military campaigns, since consular authority was at its height (and therefore represented
the greatest potential for degenerating into a military dictatorship) during wartime.
Apart from discussions of overarching themes of the relationship of virtue to statecraft, in
both The Prince and the Discourses, Machiavelli elaborated on the idea of political virtue with
reference to specific individuals drawn from the annals of Roman history. In keeping with his
foundational interest in the business of statecraft at the highest level—a term and discipline he
created almost singlehandedly—the Roman examples were chiefly Emperors or consuls, and
included exemplars ranging from the famous Marcus Aurelius to the ineffectual and virtually
unknown (but instructive) Pertinax. This survey of numerous rulers who either embodied or
rejected the qualities that Machiavelli argued were most valuable in obtaining, maintaining, and
strengthening a state led him to make some of his most disturbing statements (to conventional
political philosophers), one of which was his infamous lion-and-fox metaphor for the behavior of
rulers.
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For example, Machiavelli discovered the conduct of Emperor Septimius Severus, who
seized power by undertaking a series of secret forced marches to first position his troops in Italy,
then systematically destroyed rival claimants to the imperial purple in Africa and Gaul, achieving
ascendancy both by “arms . . . and by artifice” to be entirely worthy of emulation. 45 Where other
writers might have (justly) seen a chaotic, Darwinian period of scheming usurpers and legionbacked pretenders, Machiavelli instead concluded that Severus’s traits of courage, ambition, and
ruthlessness combined with his supple sense of honor left him specially well-fitted to rule the
Empire. In contrast, the aged, hapless, and effeminate Pertinax of Machiavelli’s account
functions as a ready-made foil to Severus as the dynamic ‘new man,’ unable to hold on to his
throne and therefore, unworthy of it. Put another way, since Severus’s opponents clearly lacked
the qualities necessary to do what must be done to get and/or maintain a position of imperial
authority (demonstrable in their defeats at his hands), Severus, though a usurper, was justified in
taking power.
Using a similar argument, Machiavelli favored the emperor Marcus Aurelius as another
‘great man’ of history to whom aspiring princes ought to look for inspiration in maintaining a
successful rule over their citizens. He portrayed Marcus as the opposite of Severus in virtually
every area with regard to character, as possessed “of a temperate disposition, [loving] justice, [an
enemy] of cruelty, gentle, kindly,” and a man of his word.46 These qualities Machiavelli judged
to be useful to Marcus because they resulted in a long reign, beneficial to the Empire inasmuch
as it enjoyed a time of stability as a result of his even-handed rule, and the educated Emperor’s
writings on Stoicism a boon to posterity.
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Important, however, is the caveat Machiavelli added with respect to the conditions
surrounding Marcus’s succession to the throne: it was a peaceful one, received through lawful
inheritance when he was at an age of majority, “not through the favor of either the soldiery or of
the people.”47 In other words, Marcus the Philosopher could afford to act as such because he was
not indebted to a social class or to the army, and he did not have to continually fear usurpation or
an uprising, having attained the throne in a lawful manner. Machiavelli concluded his analysis of
Marcus by arguing along similar lines, adding that in many instances, it was necessary for rulers
to be “other than good” in order to win and keep the support of the general population. In other
words, since “hatred is incurred as well on account of good actions as of bad,” princes must be
prepared to do what is necessary to guarantee order and stability in their state.48
Having set the two very different figures of Marcus Aurelius, last of the five ‘Good
Emperors’ and Stoic philosopher, and the ambitious, unscrupulous, and warlike usurper
Septimius Severus before his readers, Machiavelli ultimately came out in favor of the latter as a
paradigm for the aspiring ruler. The actions of Severus represented the perfect balance of fear
and respect—the importance of which Machiavelli had already demonstrated in comparing
Hannibal Barca to Scipio Africanus—and he acted neither too rashly nor too timidly. Rather,
Severus confronted his fellow claimants to the throne with responses appropriate to each; that is,
an overwhelming attack in one case and deception (until he had gained an irresistible advantage)
in the other. Justly, then, could Machiavelli famously argue that Severus’s character as a ruler
had “all the fierceness of the lion and all the cleverness of the fox,” and that the advantages of
being other than good—that is, sole rule of the most powerful Empire in Europe and the
Mediterranean—far outweighed the benefits of being judged a man who keeps his word in all
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circumstances. According to Machiavelli’s reasoning, had Marcus Aurelius been in the same
situation as Severus, it would have been far more likely that he would have played the role of
one of Severus’s outclassed and defeated opponents rather than that of the conquering victor,
benevolent ruler, and wise man all rolled into one.
In simplest terms, Severus gained the Empire on the strength of his personal traits and
maintained it with those same qualities, ending a vicious cycle of weak emperors backed by
fickle, over-powerful legions, and went on to found a dynasty that was to last over a century.
Therefore, based on a simple accounting of Severus’s actions, Machiavelli deemed the attributes
that allowed him to do so virtuous and worthy of imitation by any who desired to be politically
effective. Through the pair of examples in character juxtaposition reviewed above, it is clear that
for Machiavelli, the fact that Rome produced such figures as Septimius Severus and (ironically)
Hannibal Barca, meant it was a state whose political institutions were worthy of study in all eras,
by autocrats and republicans alike.
Virtue to Machiavelli, then, consisted of the group of traits that allowed a ruler to
achieve, consolidate, and maintain authority over a principality or republic with the least possible
bloodshed and disorder. A successful ruler was to study and imitate the various ‘great men’ and
‘captains’ of history for guidance in civic and military affairs, for states—whether republics or
princedoms—have ever been founded on robust laws and as well as strong arms. Necessary, too,
was a supple sense of honor (i.e. keeping faith when possible but never being unequivocally
bound by a moral code to do so), aided by a sense of ‘public relations’ balance with regard to the
proper proportions of fear and respect to keep the easily swayed general citizenry in check. In the
same vein, rulers were to avoid the grosser vices, but those character attributes usually defined as
flaws by philosophers—chiefly boundless ambition, ruthlessness, and personal duplicity or
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public treachery—were in fact necessary to meet and overcome the challenges presented by the
realities of politics.
Of all the eras of history he had at his disposal, Machiavelli chose to examine the
individuals and institutions of the period dominated by the Roman state for the very reason that it
was the dominant polity of the Mediterranean for such an extended period. The Roman political
system produced men and practices that proved uniquely able to triumph over enemies as varied
as hordes of howling Britons, disciplined ranks of Macedonian phalangites, destructive internal
political wrangling and weak rulers, and extended foreign incursion. And in examining the
Roman citizens and institutions forged in those crucibles, Machiavelli perceived the reason for
Roman success as the blend of the very traits listed above as present in those commanders,
rulers, and political structures.
Virtue, it seemed, consisted of the ability to rule well, and nearly any practice was
justified in the course of achieving that end, as long as stable, ordered rule was in fact attained.
Failure to do so was the result of the lack of one or more of the necessary qualities inherent in
successful rulers and long-lived states, demonstrable in the Roman victories over the maritime
power of Carthage, the Seleucid heirs to Alexander of Macedon’s Greco-Persian empire, and the
formidable Gallic and Germanic chiefdoms. In short, Rome provided the single best source of
guidance to aspiring rulers and new principalities because of its virtue, summed up in the
personal and civic attributes described above, the combination of which allowed its ascendancy
and dominion over most of Europe and the Mediterranean for nearly eight hundred years. For
Machiavelli, then, Roman virtue was synonymous with long rule, and by extension, whatever
practices led to public order and stability were virtuous, and eminently worthy of imitation in all
eras.
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Chapter Three
Comparing Roman Virtue Through the Ages: The Greco-Roman and the Florentine
Before engaging in a multi-point comparison of the views of Rome and Roman virtue in
the respective works of Polybius and Machiavelli, some review is in order. As a starting point, I
examined the life of Polybius of Megalopolis, a 2nd century BC Greek citizen who managed to
witness some and write about most of the major Mediterranean political events of his day. After
a survey of his major works, their themes and their fates, I outlined Polybius’s understanding of
the existence, definition, utility, and legacy of virtue in the context of the Roman state as it grew
from a regional Italian kingdom in the midst of aggressive neighbors into the powerful and
expansionist Roman Republic that existed in his own time. In the second section, I moved ahead
some fifteen hundred years to the life and works of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), who was a
citizen, civil servant, ostracized political opponent, and writer of history and political science of
the city of Florence. After a brief discussion of his personal life and career, I investigated
Machiavelli’s analysis of Roman virtue as expressed in Roman political structures and cultural
traits.
Through a careful reading of Polybius’s magnum opus, The Roman Histories, mainly
covering the period from 220 to 146 BC (but with some comments on early Roman history), it
seems that Polybius chose the medium of a universal history because it afforded him the scope
he felt was necessary to examine not only events themselves but the human element impelling
them. Polybius placed great stock in the Roman culture as one that valued and therefore
cultivated virtue, piety, and devotion to duty in its members, especially the impressionable
young. Doubtless his own participation in equally elaborate Greek funerary practices while still a
youth inclined him to be especially mindful of Roman customs of remembrance. However,
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Polybius’s point—that the Roman tradition of making masks of honored relatives and carrying
them along with the newly deceased in a funeral procession was a powerful method of instilling
the belief that one’s ancestors were expecting one to live up to their glorious example—is
nonetheless a convincing one.
In addition to this cultural element, Polybius justified his argument that Rome was the
ruling power in the Mediterranean due to its virtuous political institutions by undertaking an
extended comparison of noteworthy (chiefly Greek) states and their political structures to those
of Rome. After ruling democracy dangerously open to the corrupting influence of wealth and
manipulation by charismatic personalities and refusing to consider the hypothetical states
constructed by the philosophers, Polybius found in the Spartan political structure a near-perfect
form of government. In Sparta, rule by a hereditary king was balanced by the voice of a council
of elders and the suffrage of landed males of an age of majority, thereby combining all of the
three types of ‘good government’ while seemingly avoiding the related three types of corrupt
government: monarchy, oligarchy, and mob rule. Whatever the merits of this arrangement, in the
end, Polybius found the Spartan state wanting as well, for in his mind it was too conservative and
therefore inherently inflexible, unable to cope with the rigors of imperialist expansion, despite its
reputation for producing fierce warriors and a robust and wealthy culture.
Over against all these examples, Polybius set the case of Rome. As it degenerated from a
benevolent kingship into an abusive monarchy, its citizens rose up, overthrew the kings, and
remade it into a blend of the three types of good government vaguely modeled on the Spartan
system, though with several key differences. First, as it was the area with the most potential for
corruption, the Romans changed a hereditary kingship into two executive positions called
consuls (with terms of one year in length) that were filled by appointment and not able to be held
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consecutively by the same individual. Consuls were responsible for the mustering and leadership
of citizen armies in wartime, and of the great civic engineering and monument projects for which
Rome became so famous. Second, the traditional class of landed nobility found their voice in the
creation of the Senate, a regulatory body that drafted legislation, controlled the treasury, oversaw
the reception of treaties and foreign embassies, made declarations of war, and had the ability to
review the conduct of the consuls while in office. Finally, the general citizenry had a central role
in ratifying domestic and foreign legislation, determining the verdicts and punishments for
capital crimes, and appointing officials called tribunes who acted as representatives of their
wishes to check the power of the consuls.
Polybius argued that as a result of these various strands of government, which acted in
concert to allow the members of the Roman state work toward a common goal while balancing
one another against potential abuses of power, Rome was able to withstand the intense pressures
of war on foreign soil and the invasion of its own, as well as the strain of rapid imperial
expansion and rule over a diverse array of conquered peoples. This inherent flexibility was the
factor that set Rome apart from its neighbors, and was the direct result of the culture of honor,
piety, and devotion to duty glorified in Roman funeral traditions. The fact that the Romans came
to rule nearly the whole inhabited world was the central theme Polybius celebrated in his
Histories. Roman virtue was such that Rome deserved to rule, and its citizens did so by crafting a
state that was not a dominion but a protectorate, granted its position by the exalted character of
its culture and institutions.
Some fifteen hundred years later, the works of Niccolò Machiavelli present a somewhat
different interpretation of the definition of Roman virtue and the reasons for it. By accident of
birth and his family’s station, Machiavelli grew up blessed with a humanist education, allowing
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him a deep knowledge of classical Mediterranean history, and served to sharpen his already
powerful intellect and keen observational skills. Due to his prodigious administrative talents,
Machiavelli was appointed to an important post in the Florentine bureaucracy before he had
reached the age of thirty and subsequently enjoyed a fifteen-year career in municipal
government, including a number of diplomatic missions to the courts of the leading royals of the
contemporary European political scene. Though further advancement up the echelons of
Florentine government was curtailed by the return of the Medici family, after a period of
imprisonment, Machiavelli retired to a family home in the countryside and proceeded to
synthesize his observations on the inner workings of the various political ‘machines’ into which
he had come in contact during his career with his wealth of intellectual talents and knowledge of
classical history. The results of this period of semi-exile included two great works of political
science, The Prince and the Discourses on Livy, works which, when taken together, present both
an interpretive challenge to scholars as well as invaluable foundational reasoning for the
discipline of political science as separate from the field of political philosophy.
In The Prince, Machiavelli structured the many addressed topics around the task of
justifying the existence of a principality, or rule by a single individual. The basis for his assertion
is that rule by a single official possessed of sole executive powers is the most effective method
for securing order and stability in a state. Without the possibility for the stagnation that comes
with a closed assembly composed of an hereditary aristocracy or the danger of ‘mob rule’
inherent in an out-and-out democracy, Machiavelli argued that the principality was the state best
fitted to respond to whatever challenges may arise, whether foreign invasion or civil unrest.
However, the state he advocated in The Prince was not an intolerant military dictatorship but one
in which the rule of law was supreme. Both “good laws and good arms” were of vital importance
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in shoring up the authority of the prince and in helping to strengthen the state against potential
threats.49 Viewed in that light, the prince functioned merely as the executor of the national laws
and the leader of the army, which was composed of citizens, on the model of the Swiss, who
were at once the best-armed and freest in the world.50
Machiavelli argued that the highest political aim for a leader was the achievement and
maintenance of stability and order in his state. The best way to secure that goal was for princes to
be not moral or immoral but amoral, responsible for selecting the behavior—keeping faith and
being honorable, or breaking promises and acting with ruthlessness, et cetera—that best fit the
situation. To support these arguments, Machiavelli constantly referred his readers to exemplars
produced by Rome in both the Republican and Imperial periods. The centerpiece in his argument
for the conduct of a ruler was the juxtaposition of the usurper Septimius Severus, who came to
power as a result of his variety of skills at deception, generalship, and overall determination, with
the emperor and Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius who succeeded without recourse to the
legions or by deposing a rival. In Machiavelli’s estimation, Severus was the greater ruler because
of his ability to act as the situation demanded rather than being bound by a specific code of
behavior in the greater interest of establishing and maintaining order.
In the Discourses, Machiavelli adopted a stance more akin to that of an ancient political
philosopher than the ruthlessly pragmatic political realist he appeared to be in The Prince. With a
genealogical eye, he argued that as the kingship of Rome became corrupt, the citizens rose up
and created a state that resembled an improvement on the Spartan model. However, this state
was still a transitional one, able to be hijacked by a single branch of government overstepping its
intended parameters. But on the creation of the offices of the tribunes, representatives of the
49
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general citizenry whose role was to balance the power of the mostly aristocratic consuls,
Machiavelli viewed the Romans to have constructed a form of government that was resilient and
balanced, capable of dynamic expansion into an imperial state. With his argument in favor of the
importance of the tribunes, Machiavelli revealed another side of his emphasis on order and
stability set forth from the perspective of the sole executive. That is, the best way to rule a state
was through a combination of autocracy, aristocracy, and democracy. Without the democratic
element, Machiavelli implied that the Roman state would have been brittle, less able to withstand
the pressures of imperial expansion, foreign incursion, and civil unrest.

Comparing Roman Virtue through the Ages: The Eyewitness and the Political Scientist
Regarding the personal lives and contexts of each writer, the similarities between the two
men are remarkable. For example, both Polybius and Machiavelli came from families of some
considerable financial means, both were well-educated and gained valuable experience with
contemporary political processes early in life, both were either set up for or well into promising
political careers, and both were interrupted by political circumstances beyond their control.
Moreover, each man proved able to transform his respective period of exile into a productive
season of scholarship, synthesizing political acumen with eyewitness experience and a welldeveloped knowledge of history into works of great importance to the fields of history and
political science.
Until the end of their days, both Polybius and Machiavelli continued to place a premium
on action as well as reflection, with both returning to an active life as soon as circumstances
permitted. In a very real sense, then, The Histories of Polybius and The Prince and the
Discourses of Machiavelli may be read as attempts by educated, world-wise men to overcome
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personal adversity and danger to their native cities from outside political forces. In confronting
those obstacles to personal and civic stability, both writers managed to produce path-breaking
works that interwove specific philosophies of history with those of statecraft containing pictures
of a state that successfully functioned as a bulwark against inroads by foreign powers in addition
to preserving domestic order by bridling the passions of both the citizenry and the ruler(s).
However, the parallels between the two figures end there. For all their similarities,
Polybius possessed an inherently different view of the course of history than that guiding
Machiavelli’s writings. For Polybius, standing on the plains outside Carthage in 146 BC,
watching as his close friend Scipio presided over the sack of the chief city of Rome’s greatest
adversary in the Mediterranean, it must not have seemed likely that the rule of Rome would end
at any time in the near future. That fact was doubtless driven home in an intensely personal
manner when Polybius learned of the sack of the leading Greek city of Corinth and the effective
end of the Achaean League in the same year as the destruction of Carthage, no less. Polybius’s
statement of purpose at the outset of the first book of The Histories is instructive here:
“[Is] there anyone on earth who is so narrow-minded or uninquisitive that he could fail to
want to know how and thanks to what kind of political system almost the entire known
world was conquered and brought under a single empire . . . in less than fifty-three
years—an unprecedented event?”51
That Polybius recognized the unrivaled nature of the Roman accomplishment is one matter, but
the fact that he ascribes their greatness to their political structure sets the course for the rest of
The Histories.
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As a son of a major city of the Achaean League and having taken part in the political
process in roles from hipparchus of the League to tutor of a prominent Roman family to field
advisor to a Roman consul back to political advocate for Greek rights, Polybius predictably
placed a premium on the power of Roman political structures. Having had the opportunity to
observe each branch of the Roman constitution combined in effective action with the result being
dominance of the Mediterranean, his analysis of the efficacy of the Roman political system as it
existed in his day ought to be considered authoritative. It was with all of the above factors in
mind, then, that Polybius could argue that the combination of popular input, aristocratic
oversight, and executive authority with the culture of devotion to duty and public veneration of
honored dead meant that the Romans were a force to be reckoned with and would remain so long
into the future, so long as the elements mentioned above remained in place. The future was to be
one dominated by Rome, not Carthage, Megalopolis, Athens, or Sparta, so far as he could tell.
Moreover, the reason for Roman success lay in their political structures as outgrowths of a
culture that fostered virtue.
Over against Polybius’s view to the future with respect to Roman rule, Machiavelli was
essentially backward looking. Both The Prince and the Discourses seem to have been written
with a mind to spur an educated, politically motivated Italian audience to take action aimed at
welding the contemporary chaos of a patchwork of feuding Italian cities into a unified, stable
Italian nation-state. Evidence for this is supplied by his impassioned conclusion to The Prince,
appropriately (if ethnocentrically) titled, “An Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians.”
Despite the heading, it seems that, based on the foci of both The Prince and the Discourses,
Machiavelli was not primarily concerned with creating a militant, xenophobic autocracy, but was
enamored with Rome for having achieved the kind of order and stability that was non-existent in
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his own day. The heroes of The Prince and the Discourses are not only the lion-and-fox,
Septimius Severus, who took power through violence and deception (guided by a moral compass
composed of gray-scale rather than black and white distinctions to boot), but also those elected
officials who held the office of tribune, whose purpose was to check the influence of the consuls,
and by extension, the Senate, and thereby keep the general populace safe from potential abuse of
either office.
The intervening medieval centuries, from which the culture Machiavelli was born into
was only just emerging, may be at least partially responsible for his backward focus. To
Machiavelli, the political chaos of 16th century Italy was nothing new; it was merely the
unfortunate continuation of the political practices that had become the norm in the many
hundreds of years since the capitulation of the Roman Empire in the West. The next major
political entity to emerge after 476 AD was the Carolingian ‘empire,’ though even that was
barely the size of Roman Gaul, required annual campaigns to maintain its borders, and did not
long outlast the death of its founder.
Indeed, for the next several centuries, successive groups of invaders—Scandinavians in
the north and west, Avars in the east, and various Muslim peoples from the south—battered the
remnants of Carolingian state and the other kingdoms that had arisen in the meantime. From the
8th century to the 11th century, as these waves of intruders crashed against the kingdoms of
Europe, their attacks no doubt contributed to the mentality of a fragmented, decaying civilization
under siege that had arisen in the Roman psyche in response to the inroads of various Gothic and
Germanic peoples at the twilight of the Roman Empire in the West.52
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In such a culture, it is little wonder that what emerged in Machiavelli’s writings was an
essentially past-focused solution to the problems of the present. What was new, however, was
the way in which Machiavelli approached and defined those problems. Rather than speaking in
religious terms of good and evil or in ethical terms of right and wrong, Machiavelli recognized
that the issues at stake transcended trite religious and ethical answers, and were indeed problems
of humanity itself.53 “The problems of politics [have] remained unchanged for the last two
thousand years,” he declared, a statement that surely justified his selection of the Roman state—
despite its ancient status—as the primary example of the kind of statecraft he wished to apply to
contemporary Italian politics.54 In that sense, the best course for the future was to mine the past
for the most effective ways to solve the problems of the present, with the resulting feel in
Machiavelli’s best-known works being one that was less of a bold departure into a new era of
political reasoning and more of a refit of old but brilliant concepts with a new conceptual
(amoral) framework.
More important than—though perhaps because of—their opposite views of history,
Polybius and Machiavelli each possessed a fundamentally different definition of Roman virtue:
what it was, how it came to be, and what it meant for the future. As we have seen, Polybius was
essentially future-focused, writing to justify the rule of Rome out to the undefined chronological
horizon based on what he knew and had witnessed of the dynamism and resilience of Roman
cultural, political, and martial institutions. This approach in turn directly influenced his definition
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of what Roman virtue actually was. In the same way, Machiavelli’s philosophical starting point,
that the foundational purpose of the state—whether principality or republic—and therefore, its
ruler—whether monarch or assembly—was to function as the guarantor of order and stability.
The best way to achieve that goal of stability was to apply the lessons taught by the greatest state
of antiquity, which had attained and held its exalted position for so long because of the
excellence of its political institutions.
In Polybius’s eyes, Rome deserved its position as the supreme state of the powers around
the Mediterranean because of the virtuous nature of its institutions, which—because of their
essentially good nature—allowed it to govern itself, fight, and rule others with such
effectiveness. The idea was that Roman citizens would have grown up in a culture defined by
respect for the honored dead (who were honored often because of their excellence in public
service, civic and/or military) and would have been trained to emulate the deeds for which their
ancestors had been celebrated. All this so that when they achieved positions of leadership in the
political arena or in the legions, they were fitted—unlike their counterparts even in the great city
states of Greece—to accomplish feats that would also earn them a place on the rolls of their
native city’s honored dead, where their memories would serve to begin the process anew for the
next generation.
For Polybius, then, it was from this powerful combination of cultural elements that the
Romans built upon the Spartan model of governance in constructing their constitution’s balance
of powers between the three traditional types of ‘pure’ government. Moreover, it was from that
same culture that their successors, generations later, managed to rebound from the immense
pressure of Hannibal protracted invasion of Italian soil to ultimately defeat him and subdue
Carthage. Simply put, in Polybius’s mind, the Romans arose from a culture that was superior, in
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regards to politics, to those of their neighbors (including the celebrated states of Greece, the
powerful Near Eastern Seleucid and Parthian empires, and the maritime giant of Carthage). With
that culture as a basis, they crafted political structures that enabled military performance a class
above those same neighbors. In all, the Romans were justified in ruling the Mediterranean as
they did by their virtuous political institutions.
Machiavelli’s construction of the definition of Roman virtue, however, lay completely on
the other end of the spectrum from Polybius’s virtue-equals-success equation. Whether the state
in question was ruled as a principality or as a republic, the most important function of the ruler
was to maintain order. Personal flaws (excessive cruelty, pursuit of individual enrichment at the
expense of the state and/or its citizens, et cetera) and bureaucratic incompetence were to be
shunned in equal measure. But rulers were also never to shy away from applying maximum force
with all swiftness (on the battlefield as well as in response to domestic unrest) in the interest of
returning the state to a stable, prosperous condition.
Writing as he did in the tumultuous political environment of feuding families, warring
political parties, clashing cities, and foreign incursion of 16th century Italy, Machiavelli, after a
long day spent working on a family farm in the hills outside Florence, could find no better
example of the path to peace and stability than that of ancient Rome. The character of the
Republic and the conduct of the emperors were such that Roman rule was extended and
maintained over a wide variety of peoples and cultures, from wave-washed Britain to the hot, dry
lands of the Levant. Especially instructive was the emperor Septimius Severus, whose ability to
be ‘other than good’ when circumstances called for a more supple sense of honor than most
would allow themselves meant that he eventually triumphed over a number of rival claimants to
the imperial purple, ended a cycle of destructive civil wars, and even founded his own dynasty.
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In broader terms, equally of value was Roman foresight when it resulted in the creation of the
offices of the tribunes to check the potentially dangerous powers of the consuls by guaranteeing
that the aims of the general citizenry would literally be present when the consuls were making
executive decisions on civil matters or on campaign during times of war.
In addition, the centuries of the medieval period doubtless did Machiavelli no favors in
his valuation of more recent efforts at achieving and maintaining political continuity. During that
era, there was without question no single state that could command the same level of respect and
awe and the same breadth of rule than that achieved by even Republican, let alone Imperial,
Rome. Moreover, between the end of the 5th and the middle of the 16th century, the closest
successor to the overarching authority of the Roman Empire was the Roman Catholic Church,
and it was almost constantly at war (often figuratively, sometimes literally) with the more earthly
European powers for absolute hegemony in the area once unequivocally ruled by the Emperors.55
Despite the range of positive accomplishments achieved by the Church and by churchmen during
those centuries, writing as Europe was on the cusp of the Protestant Reformation, the Church
must have seemed a poor substitute for the glories of imperial Rome.
What alternative did Machiavelli have, then, but to long for the relative stability and
order as existed under the rule of Rome during antiquity? And if that was his position, what
conclusion could he come to but that whatever political and martial institutions enabled the most
55
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prosperous, stable, and longest-lived rule were by default the most virtuous? In essence, despite
the otherwise quite amoral political character of Machiavelli’s writings, the highest good—to
borrow from philosophy—was the orderly state. Therefore, the political institutions of ancient
Rome were virtuous precisely because they allowed for long, stable (relatively speaking) rule the
likes of which the Western world had not seen before or since. More importantly, because of
their tendency toward the facilitation of long, stable rule and thus political virtue, they were
singularly worthy of imitation or even recreation in contemporary political ventures.

Conclusion: Rome through the ages and Rome for the ages
So far, I have examined The Histories of Polybius of Megalopolis, eyewitness to the
power of Republican Roman political and cultural practices in action, and discussed at length the
works of Niccolò Machiavelli, a 16th-century Florentine who studied Roman politics and history
in detail and who took part in the cutthroat political atmosphere of his own day. Both men
surveyed the materials they had to hand and the world they saw around them and synthesized
their observations and abstractions into powerful works on the nature and legacy of Roman
history. Yet both ultimately adhered to a diametrically opposed definition of what he saw as the
key element in Roman success: virtue.
For Polybius, the Roman culture of reverence for and emulation of honored dead and
their capitalization on past political models led to a society that, because of its virtuous
foundations, proved able to rule the almost the whole known world. In Machiavelli’s estimation,
precisely the opposite was true, since virtue in the political sphere ought to be defined as long,
stable, (relatively) peaceful rule. As the Romans managed achieve and maintain dominion over
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much of Europe and the lands surrounding the Mediterranean for some eight hundred years, by
extension, whatever means and methods they employed must have been virtuous.
In light of this discrepancy, the question that remains to be asked is simple (though it
leads to a number of others): why? Why is it that two educated men with similar personal
backgrounds and a wealth of source material came to such divergent conclusions? Is one or the
other of them correct; perhaps neither? It seems appropriate to answer the question with another:
why not? Why should not two men so far removed in time and culture come to opposite
conclusions, even when considering essentially the same subject? To use a broad contemporary
example, present-day scholars who attend the same conferences and write on the same topics
rarely agree whole-heartedly on the answers to those issues. Surely it is less surprising that two
authors separated by a millennium and a half—the rise and fall of the whole of medieval
civilization—disagree on the final answer to a subject. It is of incredible importance to historians
and political thinkers alike that these two prodigiously gifted writers even considered the same
issue at all, and we ought to be even more grateful that their writings survive at all for our
education and enrichment.
Viewed in another light, “why did they disagree?” or “who is correct?” are the wrong
questions. Whether or not the Romans were virtuous per se, and in what fashion, is beside the
point. The true value of comparing two writers so far removed who use the same subject and
same term is that through their answers, we can understand more about the world of each writer,
and what that tells us about their view of human nature. For Polybius, the general citizenry, who
controlled “rewards and punishments . . . without which human life has no coherence, let alone
governments and constitutions,” were the true heart and soul of the Roman culture and system of
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governance.56 Though not stated in the Roman constitution, it was they who served in the
legions, wore the masks of the honored dead in the funeral processions, listened to the speeches
of the deceased’s family members extolling his virtues, and raised their children to emulate those
heroes of the past, just as much as it was they who reviewed the conduct of the consuls while in
office and decided on punishments in capital legal cases as was stated in the constitution.
The role and importance of the strong ruler emerges just as clearly in the work of
Machiavelli. His prince was to be both good and not good, both lion and fox, both cruel and
benevolent as situations demanded. He was to know and follow the examples of great men of the
past as well as managing the passions of the citizens in the present, and he was ever in all things
to pursue and maintain an orderly, prosperous, and stable state. For Machiavelli, the ruler was
the embodiment of the state, and vice versa, as was the Rome and the Roman emperors he so
admired from the annals of antiquity. To him, men had to be guided by a strong hand to achieve
great things, and the emulation of the political practices of the Republican and Imperial Romans
provided the most effective avenue to do just that.
In that sense, then, it matters little whether or not the Romans deserved to rule, as
Polybius argued, and it is rather inconsequential what Machiavelli thought about the value of
‘power politics’ and their birth in the constitution of the Romans. The true aim of studying the
genesis and evolution of abstract concepts in the historical record is more than just the discovery
of a morality figure to imitate or the uncovering of a political ethos to secure long-lasting peace.
When we study ideas—as they move through cultures and historical eras—the more we can see
of ourselves in both the writers and their subjects, the more we stand to gain.
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